Claudio v Snyder by unknown
1995 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-8-1995 
Claudio v Snyder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 
Recommended Citation 
"Claudio v Snyder" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 287. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/287 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
2 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                     
 
No. 94-7591 
                     
 
CARMELO CLAUDIO; 
ENRIQUE MAYMI, 
      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
*ROBERT SNYDER, Warden, 
Delaware Correctional Center; 
*M. JANE BRADY, Attorney 
General of the State of Delaware 
 
*(Amended as per the Clerk's 4/17/95 Order) 
       
 
                     
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 91-cv--00203) 
  
                    
 
  
                              Argued October 16, 1995 
 
 Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges 
and SHADUR1, District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed November 8, 1995) 
 
                     
 
 
Stephen M. Latimer, Esq. (Argued) 
Loughlin & Latimer 
58-60 Main Street 
Hackensack, NJ 07602 
                                                           
1Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court Judge for the 
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
3 
 
              Attorney for Appellants 
 
Loren C. Meyers (Argued) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Delaware Department of Justice 
820 N. French Street 
Wilmington, DE 19801 
 
              Attorney for Appellees 
 
 
                       
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                       
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 Carmelo Claudio and Enrique Maymi appeal the district 
court's denial of their consolidated petition for habeas corpus 
relief.  Appellants were convicted in Delaware Superior Court of 
first degree robbery, four counts of possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony, two counts of first 
degree conspiracy, and one count each of first degree murder and 
first degree attempted murder.  Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 
1279 (Del. Supr. 1991).  Appellants claim that the state trial 
court erred by:  (1) substituting an alternate juror for an ill 
juror without instructing the jury to discard previous 
deliberations and begin anew, (2) failing to issue a curative 
instruction despite allegedly inflammatory remarks by the 
prosecutor after physical evidence was excluded, and (3) 
instructing the jury on accomplice liability in a manner that 
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could lead a reasonable juror to believe that petitioners bore 
the burden of proof on that issue. 
 Jurisdiction in the district court was invoked pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) after appellants exhausted their state 
court remedies.  Claudio v. Redman, Nos. 91-203-LON, 91-209-LON, 
slip op. at 2 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 1994) (consolidated petitions of 
Claudio and Maymi).  This appeal is properly before us on a 
certificate of probable cause issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253. 
 We will affirm the district court's denial of habeas 
corpus relief on all three grounds, the second and third 
requiring no further discussion.  Because the Delaware trial 
court's substitution of an alternate juror after jury 
deliberations had already begun presents a question of first 
impression in this circuit, we further elaborate our holding on 
this issue. 
I 
 At the conclusion of appellants' state trial, the trial 
judge read his instructions to the jury and three alternate 
jurors.  Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1283.  The jury began its 
deliberations on December 1, 1987, at approximately 10:30 a.m. 
and deliberated until approximately 5:00 p.m.  During this first 
day of deliberations, the jury requested to view the defendant, 
Claudio.  The trial judge agreed, and the twelve jurors and three 
alternates were brought back into the courtroom to view Claudio. 
The jury failed to reach a verdict during the first day of 
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deliberation and was sequestered for the night.  The alternate 
jurors were separately sequestered.2  Id. 
 During the night, one of the regular jurors became ill. 
The next morning, the trial judge excused the ill juror and 
replaced that juror with one of the alternates.  The judge asked 
the three alternates if they had discussed the case amongst 
themselves during their sequestration and inquired whether they 
had read anything about the case.  Id. at 1283 n.8.  All three 
jurors responded in the negative.  The trial judge then impaneled 
the first alternate.  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but 
that motion was denied.  Id. at 1283. 
 After impaneling the new juror, the trial judge gave 
special instructions to the reconstituted jury and to the 
alternate juror.  The court instructed the original eleven jurors 
to "take whatever time is necessary, even though it may be 
repetitious and time consuming, to completely update [the 
alternate juror] as to the stage of deliberations you as a group 
have reached."  Id. at 1284 n.9.  The court then specifically 
directed the alternate juror to take as much time as necessary to 
familiarize herself with the evidence and with the thinking of 
the other jurors and to move forward only when she felt that she 
                                                           
2
 The alternate jurors were not released at the conclusion of 
trial because, in the event that the jury returned a guilty 
verdict, the defendants were subject to a post-verdict hearing to 
determine the issue of capital punishment.  Claudio v. State, 585 
A.2d at 1283 n.7 (citing Del.C. § 4209(b)). 
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was at no relative disadvantage with regard to her understanding 
of the case.3 
 The reconstituted jury deliberated from approximately 
10:01 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on December 2.  At 11:17 a.m. the jurors 
sent out a note asking if the surviving victim had been visited 
in the hospital by a Mrs. Guzman.  The note was answered an hour 
later.  On December 3 the jury reconvened at approximately 10:00 
a.m.  After a break for lunch at noon, the jury reached a verdict 
on all charges at approximately 2:00 p.m. on December 3.  Thus 
the original jury deliberated for about six and one-half hours, 
and the reconstituted jury deliberated for approximately nine and 
                                                           
3
 The Delaware Supreme court quoted the trial judge's 
instructions to the replacement juror in part as follows: 
 
You find yourself [sic] somewhat of a 
disadvantage.  Fortunately, however, with 
your diligence and the cooperation of your 
fellow jurors, you will be able to 
familiarize yourself with the deliberations 
concluded thus far, so that you are not at 
any disadvantage with regard to understanding 
all of the evidence and the views of your 
fellow jurors. It is essential and critical 
that you take whatever time is necessary to 
familiarize yourself with the evidence and 
the thinking and views of the jurors. 
      You must guard against the natural 
feelings to rush or hasten in order to keep 
up with the majority or the other 11.  I 
instruct you to be conscious, and forthright 
in telling the others if you feel any 
disadvantage with regard to the level of your 
understanding. 
      When and only when you feel 
yourself adequately and reasonably equipped 
to understand what has transpired thus far in 
the deliberations, should you signal to your 
fellow jurors your desire to move forward. 
 
Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1284 n.9. 
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one-half hours.  Id. at 1284.  The jury returned the guilty 
verdicts noted above.  Appellants were sentenced to life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole for first degree 
murder, life imprisonment with possibility of parole for 
attempted murder, and an additional forty-five years for other 
offenses. 
 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled 
that the trial court violated Delaware Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 24(c), which permits the replacement of regular jurors by 
alternates prior to deliberation only.4  Id. at 1284-85.  It also 
concluded that the substitution of the alternate juror violated 
the United States and Delaware constitutions.  Id. at 1289, 1301. 
The court held, however, that these were harmless errors.  Id. at 
1289, 1304.  The district court properly declined to review the 
state law issues involving Rule 24(c) and the Delaware 
Constitution, Claudio v. Redman, slip op. at 9 (citing Helton v. 
Fauver, 930 F.2d 1040, 1044 (3rd Cir. 1991)), and our review is 
confined to the federal constitutional challenge. 
II 
 Appellants claim that the trial court's decision to 
substitute an alternate juror after jury deliberations had 
already begun violated their right to a trial by jury under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
                                                           
4
 A stipulation by the parties that they would accept the 
unanimous verdict of eleven jurors pursuant to Delaware Superior 
Court Rule 23(b) would have resolved the situation.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court noted that the trial court never put this question 
to the parties, Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1305 n.73, and the 
record indicates that this option was not considered at the time. 
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Constitution.  The Supreme Court has summarized the essential 
feature of a jury trial: 
"Providing an accused with the right to be 
tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the 
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Given 
this purpose, the essential feature of a jury 
obviously lies in the interposition between 
the accused and his accuser of the 
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, 
and in the community participation and shared 
responsibility that results from that group's 
determination of guilt or innocence. 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (citing Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).  Appellants contend that 
the introduction of an alternate juror after deliberations had 
begun vitiated the essential purpose of the jury by disrupting 
the community participation and shared responsibility that the 
Supreme Court deemed essential.  Appellants' Brief at 15 (quoting 
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100).  The introduction of an alternate 
juror after the commencement of deliberations violates the 
"sanctity of the deliberative process" in a manner that renders 
the trial fundamentally unfair, according to appellants.  Id. at 
15, 16 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 100); Appellants' Reply 
Brief at 5. 
 The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the 
constitutionality of substituting an alternate juror after jury 
deliberations have begun.  Most of the federal courts that have 
addressed the issue, however, have held that when circumstances 
require, substitution of an alternate juror in place of a regular 
juror after deliberations have begun does not violate the 
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Constitution, so long as the judge instructs the reconstituted 
jury to begin its deliberations anew and the defendant is not 
prejudiced by the substitution.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1987); Peek v. Kemp, 784 
F.2d 1479, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 939 (1986); Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986), and cert. denied sub 
nom., Freeman v. Stagner, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986); United States v. 
Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub 
nom., Soteras v. U.S., 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. 
Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1980).  But see United 
States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) 
(finding impermissible coercion of juror when original jury 
required four hours to render verdict but reconstituted jury 
required only twenty-nine minutes). 
 In both Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d at 1484-85, and Miller 
v. Stagner, 757 F.2d at 995, federal courts declined to grant 
habeas corpus relief to petitioners convicted in state 
proceedings by juries including one or more alternates 
substituted after jury deliberations had begun.  In Miller, two 
jurors were dismissed on the fifth day of jury deliberations and 
replaced with alternates over the objections of defense counsel. 
Miller, 757 F.2d at 995.  The Ninth Circuit held that the 
substitution of the alternate jurors did not violate appellants' 
federal constitutional rights because the procedure followed by 
the trial court "preserved the 'essential feature' of the jury 
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required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."  Id. (citing 
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100). 
 Unlike the California penal code at issue in Miller, 
however, Delaware's Superior Court Criminal Code permits 
replacement of regular jurors by alternate jurors only prior to 
deliberations.  Compare Miller, 757 F.2d at 995 n.3 with Claudio 
v. State, 585 A.2d at 1284 n.11, 1285.  By substituting an 
alternate juror after deliberations had begun, the Delaware trial 
court violated Rule 24(c) of the Delaware Criminal Code.  The 
relevant question for us, though, is whether the state court 
violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
constitution, not whether it violated a state rule of criminal 
procedure. 
   Analogous federal cases make clear that a violation of 
the established criminal procedure is not sufficient in itself to 
create a constitutional violation.  Several courts have held that 
the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations have 
begun in a federal criminal trial violates Rule 24(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  But despite the 
characterization of Rule 24(c) as "a mandatory requirement that 
should be scrupulously followed," federal courts have generally 
ruled that the substitution of a juror after deliberations have 
begun does not violate the United States Constitution, provided 
that defendants suffered no prejudice as a result.  United States 
v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 994-95 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982), and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 
(1982) (citing cases); see also Guevara, 823 F.2d at 448; 
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Josefik, 753 F.2d at 587; Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1056-57.  In 
Hillard, for example, a juror became ill after two and one-half 
days of deliberations and a three-day holiday recess.  Hillard, 
701 F.2d at 1055.  The district court excused the ill juror and 
impaneled an alternate juror, and the jury returned several 
verdicts over the following two days.  The Second Circuit upheld 
these verdicts against a constitutional challenge despite the 
violation of Rule 24(c) because the "essential feature" of the 
jury was preserved: 
 
The alternates were chosen along with the 
regular jurors and by the same procedures. 
They heard all the evidence and the 
instructions on the law with the regular 
jurors.  Moreover, the alternate chosen to 
replace the ill juror reaffirmed his ability 
to consider the evidence and deliberate 
fairly and fully . . .. The trial judge 
instructed all the jurors to begin their 
deliberations anew . . .. 
Id. at 1056-57.  Thus, even though the pertinent rule of criminal 
procedure was violated, the court found no constitutional 
violation absent evidence that the defendant suffered prejudice 
as a result. 
 Like the petitioners in Hillard, appellants in this 
case cite no prejudice that would elevate a violation of a rule 
of criminal procedure to a violation of the United States 
Constitution.  The alternates in this case were chosen along with 
the regular jurors, and they heard all of the same evidence and 
legal instructions simultaneously with the regular jurors.  The 
replacement juror reaffirmed that she had not discussed the case 
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and that she had not been exposed to media reports.  Whereas the 
reconstituted jury in Hillard deliberated for slightly less time 
than the original jury before rendering its verdict, the 
reconstituted jury in this case continued its deliberations for a 
slightly longer time than the originally impaneled jury. 
 The fact that the Delaware trial court did not 
specifically instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew is 
not dispositive.  The trial court instructed the original jurors 
to "take whatever time is necessary" to completely inform the 
replacement juror of all previous deliberations and of each 
juror's individual point of view.  It also instructed the 
replacement juror to guard against the inclination to proceed 
before she was thoroughly familiar with the evidence and the 
views of the other jurors.  See supra note 2.  Although the trial 
judge never specifically directed the jury to "begin anew," we 
agree with the district court that the trial court's instructions 
were the functional equivalent of such an instruction.  The 
instructions were designed to eliminate any disadvantage that the 
alternate juror may have felt as a result of her late 
introduction into the deliberations and to ensure her full, 
effective, and uncoerced participation in all aspects of the 
deliberations.  The words "begin anew" carry no talismanic power, 
and we would exalt form over substance were we to ignore the 
salutary effect of the trial court's instructions in this case. 
 Because the trial court's instructions were the 
functional equivalent of an instruction to "begin anew," we find 
no evidence that the substitution of the alternate juror 
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compromised the "essential feature" of a trial by jury.  We will 
therefore affirm the district court's denial of appellants' 
request for habeas corpus relief. 
 
 
 
 
